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Abstract 
Purpose - This paper considers the potential for profit under new public management, 
through a study of New Zealand’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs).   
Methodology/approach - ‘Examination from the outside’ involved analysis of financial data 
from 2001 to 2005 for the SOE sector.  ‘Inquiry from the inside’ involved interviews with 
senior executives from 12 of the 17 SOEs operating in New Zealand.   
Findings - Findings indicate the potential for SOEs as profitable government investments, 
with clear support for financial returns under NPM.   
Research limitations/implications - While this study is limited to SOEs in New Zealand, it 
provides valuable insight into one country’s SOE sector, and offers a platform for similar 
studies in other countries.  Strong financial returns from several SOEs highlight the potential 
for SOEs as valuable investments, and an important alternative to traditional sources of 
government funding.  However, variations noted in the financial returns of individual SOEs 
also indicate profitable and commercial operations may not be possible in all cases.  
Originality/value of paper - The value of this paper lies in the combination of quantitative 
and qualitative data, to provide insight not only into SOEs’ financial performance, but also 
the operational and strategic issues underlying that performance.  
 
 
Keywords: financial returns, new public management, state-owned enterprises  
 2
Introduction  
 
Management of the public sector has been considered from various perspectives with a 
common divide being government’s role as one of rowing versus steering (Osborne and 
Gaebler, 1992).  Consistent with the traditional role of government, researchers and 
practitioners such Moe (1994) and Moore (1992) contend government’s role is one of policy 
and administration to foster economic development; providing a stable and progressive 
society.  The notion of new public management (NPM) or managerialism (Mulgan, 1997), 
however, has gained increasing attention in recent years, and is supported by various studies 
(Bozec et al., 2002; Holz, 2002; Ramamurti, 1986; Shirley, 1999; Weinstock, 2002) which 
contend there is a strong case for government contributing directly (through activity or 
“rowing”) as well as indirectly (through policy or “steering”) to economic activity and 
development.   
 
Central to the debate on NPM is the question of the financial and economic returns 
achievable from this alternative framework for public sector management (Zahra and Hansen, 
2000). While the concept of a more efficient approach to public sector management has been 
well received, a more comprehensive approach to NPM involving commercial and profitable 
operations within the public sector has received significant criticism (Moore, 1992; Savas, 
1981).  In particular, a traditional view of the public sector as inefficient and bureaucratic has 
resulted in much scepticism regarding the potential for profit under NPM (Hood, 1995; 
Lapsley, 1999).  This scepticism is consistent with traditional property rights theory (Alchian, 
1987; Coase, 1960; Demsetz, 1967), which promotes the view that the public sector is less 
efficient in using resources to maximise wealth. 
 
Accordingly, this paper seeks to address the debate regarding the potential for profitability 
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within NPM through an examination of New Zealand’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs).  
New Zealand’s reforms with respect to SOEs are recognised as comprehensive in nature, 
successful in increasing service efficiency, and a prime example of NPM (Easton, 1999; 
Eggers, 1997; Schick, 1998).  Polidano (1999) notes New Zealand’s reforms are a clear 
example of NPM, involving a systematic approach.  Khaleghian and Das Gupta (2005: 1084) 
refer to New Zealand as a “poster country” for NPM with sweeping reforms being adopted in 
the mid 1980s. Thus, an examination of New Zealand’s SOEs provides a valuable context in 
which to consider the potential for financial returns within NPM, particularly in recent years, 
given New Zealand’s strong economic performance and steady growth (New Zealand 
Treasury, 2006).   
 
The following sections of this paper outline alternative frameworks for public sector 
management.  The implications for financial performance evaluation under these frameworks 
are then considered, followed by an overview of New Zealand’s SOE reforms as a contextual 
background to this study.  The research method involving an examination of the financial 
returns and underlying operations of New Zealand’s SOEs is then summarised, followed by 
presentation and discussion of data analysis and findings.  Lastly, findings from this study are 
used as a basis to consider the financial returns from NPM to the New Zealand Government, 
and the implications of financial returns under NPM in general. 
 
Frameworks for public sector management 
While the traditional association of public sector management and bureaucracy has a long 
history (Moe, 1994), new perspectives on public sector management raise the issue of 
improved efficiency and the potential for financial returns (Ramamurti, 1986).  These 
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changing perspectives are considered below under the headings of policy, privatisation, and 
practice. 
 
Policy 
Attention in the area of steering has focused primarily on government assisting and 
supporting the private sector through the promotion of policies to foster economic 
development and growth.  Such policies include legislation which is open and supportive of 
business development (Swierczek and Quang, 2004), streamlined regulatory requirements 
(Bharath, 2004), and increased assistance in accessing finance (Prince, 2003).  Specific 
initiatives employed by governments include establishing trade export offices in foreign 
cities, attracting foreign investment through the establishment of industry and trade zones, 
business incubators, tax incentives for foreign investors, regionalised finance incentives (e.g. 
low interest loans for businesses located in areas of high unemployment), and government 
supported capital venture programs.  While Ventriss (2002) acknowledges the popularity of 
such initiatives by governments in developed countries, he also questions their effectiveness, 
comparing funding allocated to such programs with the financial returns received.  
 
Privatisation 
Economic development through privatisation has also been widely promoted as effective 
government policy (Moore, 1992; Zahra and Hansen, 2000).  A priority of policy making, 
and a contrast in skill base between politicians and businessmen (Moe, 1994; Morris and 
Kuratko, 2002) are common factors in the case for privatisation.  Economic benefits resulting 
from privatisation include substantial revenue from the sale of government assets, reduction 
in national debt and elimination of losses sustained by unprofitable government 
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organisations, and an increase in the tax revenue base from growing profits of businesses 
under private sector ownership and management (Moore, 1992).  
 
Those in support of privatisation however, have also acknowledged a number of obstacles 
requiring attention (Zahra and Hansen, 2000).  Such obstacles include privatisation 
essentially being a costly and involved process, the loss of national resources through the sale 
of assets, uncertainties regarding the abilities and intentions of any new private sector 
management, increase in unemployment due to subsequent downsizing, resulting loss of trust 
in the political system, public resentment of foreign ownership, reduction in public sector 
spending, increased costs of good and services, and elimination of industry subsidies to 
domestic private sector organisations operating within privatised industries.   
 
Nations such as Chile, Egypt, Poland, and Russia have all provided lessons on issues to avoid 
in the course of privatisation (Zahra and Hansen, 2000).  Extreme disparity of wealth, 
perceived inequity, corruption within the privatisation process, and lengthy delays in 
transforming established institutional mindsets of SOEs: “a monumental undertaking that 
sometimes takes decades to achieve” (Zahra and Hansen, 2000: 97); are just some examples.  
Despite these issues, exploring privatisation continues to be seen as a viable option by 
policymakers in response to the “persistent failure of SOEs” (Zahra and Hansen, 2000: 85).  
Specifically, Moore (1992: 116) contends “state-owned industries will always perform 
poorly” due to a lack of self-interest, competition, and customer focus.   
      
Practice 
The notions of managerialism (Mulgan, 1997), new public management (Hood, 1995), and 
entrepreneurial government (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992) have gained increasing attention in 
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recent years, and suggest management of the public sector should be more closely aligned 
with that of the private sector (Martin, 2003).  Such principles however, are not new and can 
be traced back to the works of Woodrow Wilson (1887) who viewed public administration as 
a business.  Doig (1985), among others, argues these views remain equally relevant to 
modern day public administration.   
 
Thus the notion of government employing private sector management techniques in order to 
move towards a more commercial and efficient form of public administration has resurfaced.  
In particular, objectives such as operational efficiency or excellence (Osborne and Gaebler, 
1992), creative solutions (Lewis, 1980) to establish new revenue streams (Bellone and Goerl, 
1992), cost minimisation (Ramamurti, 1986), strong customer focus (Linden, 1990), and 
commercial viability (Cullen and Cushman, 2000), are increasingly viewed as equally 
relevant to government and non-government organisations. 
 
Financial performance evaluation in the public sector 
While financial measures remain central to performance evaluation in the private sector, 
debate exists regarding the role of accounting and financial measures with respect to 
performance evaluation in the public sector (Carlin, 2005).  A traditional view of role 
government’s role as regulator and administrator has effectively shifted the focus away from 
accountability for financial performance, and emphasised accountability for addressing social 
objectives and outcomes within the constraints of available resources.  Thus, a policy-based 
approach to public sector management has limited the role of accounting to stewardship, such 
that performance is evaluated using non-financial measures and approaches.  These 
approaches include models such as the 3 E’s of economy, efficiency, and effectiveness 
(Foltin, 2005), benchmarking against targets and competitors (Niven, 2002), and balanced 
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scorecards (Kaplan, 1996) based on non-financial measures such as a customer focus.   Yet 
each of these approaches have been noted as inadequate and at times misleading (Lynch and 
Cross, 1991; Moore, 1992; Villalonga, 2000).   
 
A number of criticisms have been raised with respect to the use of non-financial performance 
measures.  A focus solely on customers or the 3 E’s can overlook financial performance; 
benchmarking may involve soft targets.  Comparisons between public sector organisations 
and privatised firms are often misleading, given the dynamics of privatisation involve 
environmental and regulatory changes, as well as changes in management and performance 
(Villalonga, 2000).  Evaluation of an organisation’s targets in isolation may not reveal 
inconsistencies between those targets and central Government’s broader strategies.  
Qualitative measures are inherently subjective, and may involve indicators which do not 
clearly represent positive or negative outcomes (Moore, 1992).  By way of example, as an 
increase in staff numbers may be a positive reflection of a growing business, or a negative 
reflection of employment policies which accommodate inefficiency and low productivity.  
Thus a focus on non-financial measures alone seems insufficient and potentially deceptive.   
 
The tension between financial and non-financial aspects of performance is noted by Carnegie 
and West (2005) who acknowledge the conflict faced by public sector organisations with 
respect to operational and financial efficiency.  In particular, they raise the issue of 
establishing an appropriate balance between the financial resources required and relevant 
outputs generated, suggesting a trade-off exists between the two.  Arguably, however, such 
trade-offs are relevant to all organisations, in both the public and private sector, and represent 
one aspect of financial management and financial performance. 
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With respect to privatisation, the scope of financial accountability extends to the sale of 
government assets for an appropriate market value, and continuing to manage the economy 
through post privatisation policy.  The issue of under-valuing government assets is a topic 
which has received much attention within the area of privatisation, and is a key aspect of 
financial accountability for governments undertaking privatisation (Shirley, 1999).  Beyond 
specific accountability for the privatisation process however, the scope of financial 
accountability under this approach to public sector management is similar to that associated 
with policy-making.  Thus, the focus becomes managing social objectives within the 
constraints of available resources, and transparency in accounting for the financial resources 
used.  This is supported by accountability and performance evaluation literature which 
reveals a clear emphasis on service outputs as a function of financial inputs, as well as non-
financial measures of performance evaluation in a public sector context (Ballantine et al., 
1998; Foltin, 2005; Niven, 2002).  As noted by White (2005), however, basic accountability 
for resources used does not necessarily equate to good performance. 
 
Alternative perspectives on public sector management such as new public management and 
managerialism, replace traditional associations of government (e.g. bureaucracy, inefficiency, 
and a non-profit focus), with expectations of commercial, proactive, and profitable 
operations, in the context of the public sector (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992).  The financial 
implications of this approach to public sector management clearly broaden the scope of 
financial accountability, potentially encompassing accountability for both financial 
performance and profit.  Thus, accountability within the public sector goes beyond 
management of financial resources used (Carnegie and West, 2005), and increasingly 
encompasses management of financial results (SOE Act, 1986).   
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This approach to public sector management is gaining increasing attention in numerous 
countries which have gradually broadened the scope of financial accountability within the 
public sector (Shirley, 1999).  Incremental changes in this direction include legislation and 
reporting requirements in the United States (e.g. Government Performance and Results Act, 
and Service Efforts and Accomplishments reports) and Australia (e.g. accounting standards 
such as AAS 29 and AAS 31).  More extensive reforms such as those in New Zealand (e.g. 
SOE Act, 1986) as part of the country’s broader public sector reforms, further highlight the 
increasing focus on financial performance within the public sector.   
 
Accordingly, this paper evaluates the potential for financial returns within NPM in the 
context of New Zealand’s SOEs.  Essentially the focus of this research is the potential for 
SOEs as profitable investments for government.  Specifically, the research question to be 
addressed is ‘Have New Zealand’s SOE reforms resulted in positive financial returns?’  
Before addressing this question, the following section presents an overview of New 
Zealand’s SOE reforms, as a contextual background to this study.       
 
Contextual background 
In the 1980s New Zealand underwent significant government reform with the intention of 
increasing efficiency and effectiveness within the public sector (Mulgan, 1997).  Such 
reforms are consistent with the international trend in public sector management to align 
management of public sector organisations with that of private sector organisations (Martin, 
2003).  Thus, this new approach focused on emphasising results and outcomes, together with 
effective use of public sector resources.  
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As part of these reforms, government departments with a strong trading function were 
corporatised or privatised, on the premise that such services could be more efficiently 
provided by commercially orientated organisations, rather than subject to ministerial control 
and government interference.  The rationale for such reform was the inefficiency of 
government as a provider of commercial services, due to protection from the discipline of a 
free market economy, often operating in a monopolistic environment, with the availability of 
on-going financial support from central government.   
 
Specifically, New Zealand’s SOE reforms involved market deregulation, with express profit-
making requirements imposed on SOEs, resulting in accountability for both competitive 
services and commercial results.  Other features of the reforms included self-funding 
obligations, separation of SOE management and state, the role of Government as purchaser of 
outputs rather than provider of inputs, and performance based contracts and rewards (Brash, 
1996).   Thus, corporatisation provided the opportunity for these departments to become both 
efficient and profitable, enabling freedom of commercial choice and responsibility for 
commercial results.   
 
Under the SOE Act (1986), where SOEs are required to meet non-commercial and social 
objectives by Government, these services must be purchased from individual SOEs.  Hence, 
any non-commercial activities are transparent, and funded on a fee for service basis by the 
Government.  Other commercial activities can be undertaken by SOEs at their discretion, 
similar to private sector organisations, and are not subject to price controls or rate of return 
restrictions.  However, similar to private sector organisations, SOEs are subject to various 
industry regulators and the Commerce Commission, which oversees business activity within 
New Zealand to ensure unfair or anti-competitive behaviour does not take place [1].  
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SOEs are expected to pay regular dividends to the Crown, based on the surplus cash balance 
available within each SOE.  This payment is negotiated regularly between individual SOEs 
and the Government.  Funding requirements, in addition to the amount of capital contributed 
by Government, are the responsibility of individual SOEs, and typically represented by debt 
financing from private sector institutions on commercial terms [2].  The Government expects 
SOEs to have a balance of debt and equity funding, and SOEs’ debt to equity ratios are 
reviewed regularly by the Government [3].   
 
New Zealand’s public sector reforms with respect to SOEs are largely viewed as successful, 
resulting in increased efficiency of services to the public (Easton, 1999; Mulgan, 1997).  Yet 
uncertainty remains regarding the effect of those changes and resulting benefits, particularly 
from a macro-economic perspective.  “There is a lot of evidence that the corporatisation of 
SOEs gave some benefits, especially in financial productivity, but there is very little that 
there was an overall benefit to the economy” (Easton, 1999: 8).  These sentiments are echoed 
by Alan Bollard, then Secretary of the New Zealand Treasury (2000: 10): 
While we have made significant improvements to the performance of the public sector 
over the last 15 years – to the point where the World Competitiveness Yearbook ranks 
New Zealand fifth out of 47 countries for the quality of its public service – there are a 
number of areas where we need to lift our game.   
 
We do not have as much information as we would like on how effective government 
organisations are – that is, how their activities relate to the resources they 
receive…and there is limited information on the Crown’s ownership interest in the 
organisations it owns. 
 
Given the steady growth in the New Zealand economy in recent years (New Zealand 
Treasury, 2006), and the progression of SOEs to commercial organisations which are 
gradually forming their own strategic direction, a review of contemporary SOE financial 
performance provides the opportunity to examine both the financial outcomes and 
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implications.  Thus, an examination of SOEs’ financial performance over the five year period 
from 2001 to 2005 allows us to consider the potential for financial returns under NPM.  An 
outline of the research method, incorporating analysis of financial and non-financial data is 
presented in further detail below.  
 
Method 
Given that limited research has been conducted in this area, a combination of quantitative and 
qualitative data was considered necessary to understand both outcomes and underlying issues 
(Cohen et al., 2000; Eisenhardt, 1989; Villalonga, 2000).  This method effectively provided 
the opportunity for examination from the outside and inquiry from the inside (Evered and 
Louis, 1981) - investigating the financial returns resulting from New Zealand’s SOE reforms, 
and the broader practical and theoretical implications in the context of NPM in general (Yin, 
2003).   
 
Summary financial data was collected and analysed for each of the SOEs from 2001 to 2005, 
providing a longitudinal perspective of financial performance (Low and MacMillan, 1988; 
Villalonga, 2000; White, 2005).  As mentioned previously, this period was chosen to provide 
contemporary insight into SOEs’ financial performance, and coincides with a period of 
economic growth within New Zealand.  Further, it represents the period prior to the adoption 
of the new International Financial Reporting Standards [4] by any of the 17 SOEs, effectively 
allowing enhanced comparability of the financial statements across SOEs and among 
individual SOEs for the five year period.  Triangulated qualitative data collection involved 
interviews with a senior executive from 12 of the 17 SOEs operating in New Zealand, textual 
analysis, and observation.  The interviews were recorded, transcribed, and coded for both 
content and themes central to each SOE’s operations and financial performance.  Data from 
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interviews were compared with observation and texts from websites, annual reports, and 
newspaper articles, forming the basis of case studies on each SOE.   
 
Case studies were analysed individually and collectively through an iterative process.  By 
comparing and contrasting individual cases clear patterns emerged, and a number of 
underlying themes were identified and reinforced.  Findings from the data analysis are 
presented below from two separate perspectives: examination from the outside based on 
secondary financial data, and inquiry from the inside based on primary interview data.       
 
Findings 
Analysis of SOEs financial performance – examination from the outside 
As noted previously, organisations designated as SOEs in New Zealand have been recognised 
for their strong trading function.  Table 1 presents a summary of the individual SOEs, 
highlighting the wide range of industries in which they operate.  These industries can be 
broadly classified as energy (five SOEs), agriculture (four SOEs), forestry, transport (two 
SOEs), education, weather, post, property valuation, and transmission services. The range of 
industries covered by the SOE sector highlights the diversity of SOEs’ operations, and also 
raises the complexity of comparisons within the sector, given their differences.   
Take in Table 1. 
 
The commonality, however, within the sector, is that each SOE has been viewed as 
commercially viable, with a mandate to operate as a financially independent, profitable 
organisation under the New Zealand Government’s long term hold strategy.  This strategy 
formally confirmed the Government’s intention not to sell any of the SOEs, on the basis that 
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they are valuable national assets providing core services with the potential for commercial 
operations.   
 
The financial performance of the SOE sector over a five year period is summarised in Table 
2, the key components of which are explained briefly below. 
Take in Table 2. 
 
A review of SOEs’ revenues over the five year period to consider sustainability and growth in 
income from commercial operations reveals steady growth, with the exception of a decrease 
in 2004 attributable to the ongoing review of the sector and subsequent reclassification of one 
SOE to a Crown Entity [5].  An examination of profits over the same period to evaluate the 
commercial success and continuing viability of SOEs also reveals steady growth from 2001-
2003, with a substantial increase (74%) in 2005.  Contributed capital has remained relatively 
stable, with increases in owners’ equity primarily attributable to increases in retained 
earnings.  Liabilities and debt financing have also shown gradual increases, with the 
exception of 2002.   
 
A review of the returns to Government in the form of dividends and tax payments shows 
relatively stable returns from income tax, with some variation in dividend payments.  Such 
variation is due to a number of reasons, including payment of one-off capital and special 
dividends, and regular negotiations between the Government and individual SOEs regarding 
the availability of excess cash and the need to reinvest profits.  The returns generated are 
compared with the funds employed by Government in the SOEs through the calculation of 
three ratios: return on equity (ROE), return on capital invested (ROCI), and return on 
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investment (ROI).  Collectively, these ratios present financial measures of SOE performance 
from three perspectives: a traditional measure, Government as owner, and Government as 
investor.     
 
While ROE figures indicate the SOE sector has achieved reasonable and stable returns 
conducting commercial operations in deregulated markets with ROE in the range of 7-9%, 
calculation of ROCI (8-20%) and ROI (8-16%) further reinforce this notion, with 
increasingly strong returns in these ratios in 2005 (20% and 16% respectively).  Analysis of 
ROE components in terms of asset turnover (revenue/total assets), profit margin 
(NPAT/revenue), and leverage (total assets/equity) reveals consistently strong asset  turnover 
(five year average of 47% for the SOE sector), modest profit margins (five year average of 
9% for the SOE sector), and very strong leverage for the relevant period (five year average of 
184% for the SOE sector), as shown in Table 3 below.  Further, additional leverage 
calculations in terms of Total liabilities/equity and Debt/equity, show a clear mix of equity 
and debt financing.   
Take in Table 3. 
 
A review of these components, however, raises a number of issues and complexities.  As 
noted previously, individual SOEs operate in a diverse range of industries, thus some 
variation would be expected within the ratios based on differing industry issues.  Within the 
sector as a whole, however, profit margins are consistently low across each SOE.  With 
respect to leverage, consistently strong ratios across the sector raise the issue of asset 
valuation methods adopted by each SOE.  However, a review of each SOE’s asset valuation 
methodology and asset revaluation reserve movements over the relevant five year period, 
reveals historical cost is the dominant valuation method used.  Further, where ROE was 
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recalculated to exclude any component of equity represented by ARR movements, very little 
difference resulted in the ROE calculations for the sector as a whole.  Only one SOE’s return 
on equity calculation showed a material difference (7% nominal increase for 2005), when 
equity was adjusted to exclude ARR increases, however the effect on the SOE’s average 
ROE calculation over the five year period was just 1%.   
 
Thus, while the sector as a whole appears to be performing well, more detailed analysis based 
on an examination of the financial measures for individual SOEs provides an enhanced 
understanding of the similarities and differences among SOEs with respect to financial 
performance.   These findings are presented in Table 4, summarising average figures over the 
five year period for each of the 17 SOEs operating in New Zealand.   
Take in Table 4. 
 
Results have been coded under three categories by reference to the traditional measure of 
ROE.  Arbitrary cut-offs have been imposed as follows: high performance being identified as 
ROE ≥ 15%, medium performance for ROE of more than 5% but less than 15%, and low 
performance as ROE ≤ 5%.  The exception noted in Table 4 is the classification of New 
Zealand Railways Corporation (NZ Railways) in the low category, despite a ROE of 25%.  
The reason for this classification is NZ Railways’ dependency on Government funding and 
grants (discussed in further detail in the following section).  The high-low variation noted 
within the findings shown in Table 4 is summarised in Table 5, highlighting the range of 
results for each measure within the SOEs examined. 
Take in Table 5. 
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While an overview of individual SOE’s financial performance highlights the similarities 
(Table 4) and differences (Table 5), inquiry from the inside provides the opportunity to 
understand some of the issues underlying the financial outcomes of the respective SOEs.  
These issues are considered below, based on data from interviews with senior executives 
from 12 of the 17 SOEs. 
 
Analysis of SOEs’ financial performance – inquiry from the inside 
An internal perspective of SOEs suggests New Zealand’s public sector reforms are operating 
effectively.  Senior executives’ comments indicate SOEs are operating in deregulated 
markets, and competing openly against private sector firms.   
It’s the model of getting separated from Government, putting in a commercial Board, 
and holding them accountable, that has worked very well.  It’s survived several 
governments and obviously change of governments and ministers.  And to be honest, 
we, and a lot of our clients, when we talk to them, we talk about commercialisation 
(Senior executive, SOE B) [6].  
 
It seems to work quite well in terms of the Government letting you know what their 
view is on matters, and your Board at times being able to push back and say ‘well we 
hear what you’re saying, but this is what we as a Board, as an independent SOE 
Board, believe we need to do’.  So I think while it’s a funny sort of model, it does 
seem to work (Senior executive, SOE L). 
   
Revenue from Government is minimal, and in each case services provided to Government are 
won (and lost) through commercial tender.  Interview comments show a large majority of 
executives believe there is freedom of commercial choice, and a high awareness of 
responsibility for commercial results. 
It’s no different to any other commercial organisation; you have to convince your 
shareholder [that what you’re doing] is in their best interests (Senior executive, SOE 
F). 
 
We have to be commercially successful.  If [a project’s] a success you’ll have plenty 
of politicians queuing up to say how well you’ve done, but if it’s a failure you’ll get 
kicked (Senior executive, SOE D). 
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Of the seven SOEs classified as having high returns, five have contributed capital of less than 
$20 million.  Commonalities which emerge among SOEs in this category include a clear 
understanding of how to utilise the SOE’s core asset base in a commercial context, and a 
strategic direction founded on those assets, expertise developed in the SOE’s core business 
area, and opportunities identified in the market.   
We have a strong technical base and one of the things we’ve done and we’ve done 
very well, is operationalised the [business].  We had a look at [potential changes] and 
found that we could increase our capacity, reduce our costs, and increase profits.  And 
a lot of our industry is looking at us and saying ‘can we use your models?’ (Senior 
executive, SOE A). 
 
We’ve got a capability for [providing services for] any particular spot on earth.  
There’s all sorts of other things we could do [e.g. marine-based services], but there’s a 
few other companies doing that service very well, so we’re not going there.  We don’t 
want to try to catch up to people who are doing well; that’s quite hard strategically 
(Senior executive, SOE G).   
 
Other commonalities among SOEs in the high performing category include recognition for 
expertise within their core business through requests for consultancy services in international 
markets; expanding into markets directly associated with the SOE’s core business, and 
maintaining a low cost structure.   
We’re able to solve a range of problems, not the least of which is cost (Senior 
executive, SOE G). 
 
With profits of only a couple of million dollars a year, that’s not a lot of cash to drive 
marketing activity (Senior executive, SOE K).  
 
In response, the SOE identified cost-effective promotional activities through voluntary 
involvement in high-profile newspaper features and television programmes directly related to 
its core business. 
 
The model under which SOEs operate and the explicit accountability for profitable 
operations, provides a clear operating framework for all SOEs, requiring commercial and 
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competitive operations.  Within this framework several SOEs in the high performing category 
have developed a level of expertise which has established them in international markets. 
Not every SOE has succeeded.  One that crashed and burned is Terralink.  But in 
general, most SOEs have done pretty well.  It’s interesting if you look at the SOEs in 
New Zealand.  Quite a few of them are held up to be in the top three [to] five of their 
organisation and industry types around the world.  I don’t think that is a coincidence” 
(Senior executive, SOE B). 
 
 
Of the seven SOEs in the medium ROE category, four are in the business of energy 
generation.  While the inclusion of these firms in the medium category may be partly an 
industry issue, findings from interviews with SOEs in this category indicate these SOEs have 
established a clear strategic direction, but remain at the stage of developing their asset base.  
By way of example, several of the SOEs in this category were focused on exploration and 
development, or were awaiting regulatory approval to proceed with development plans.  
Thus, several large scale projects had not yet been commissioned and required further 
investment before returns could be generated.  Findings also reveal each of the SOEs in this 
category had developed small areas of expertise, however revenue streams from these areas 
within each SOE remained small (less than 5% of individual SOE turnover). 
The international consultancy is not going to be significant [in terms of revenue].  
We’re probably talking hundreds of thousands of dollars in revenue, rather than 
millions.  Our revenue is [hundreds of millions] a year, so it’s never going to be a big 
part of the business.  However our thinking is that our core business needs attention, 
and that it has to be our focus (Senior executive, SOE L). 
 
We have a lot of projects, new projects, underway and planned.  Investing in 
infrastructure and new generation are the big issues, so we are pushing ahead with a 
number of new projects in those areas (Senior executive, SOE D).  
 
Three SOEs are included in the third category, with ROE ≤ 5%.  Similar to SOEs with a 
medium ROE, inclusion in this category may also be partly an industry issue.  SOEs in this 
category represent a range of industries, including farming, forestry, and transport - each of 
which have relatively low profit expectations, based on comments from interviewees.  As 
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noted previously, despite a ROE of 25%, NZ Railways has been included in this group on the 
basis that it remains largely reliant upon the Government for financial assistance.  Thus, 
further examination of NZ Railways provides valuable insight into a case of corporatisation 
which has not resulted in commercial success.   
 
NZ Railways was privatized in 1993, purchased by Toll New Zealand Limited (Toll), and 
subsequently rebranded.  In 2004, NZ Railways repurchased New Zealand’s railway 
infrastructure from Toll, noting the infrastructure had not been maintained, and that 
significant funding (in the range of $200 million) would be required for its restoration and 
upgrade (NZ Railways, 2005).  Toll continues to use the railways under an access agreement; 
however a dispute relating to the amount payable under this agreement resulted in the 
Government compensating New Zealand Railways for the amount Toll refused to pay in 
2005.   While revenue is generated from a range of activities including consultancy services, 
and the lease and sale of property along the rail corridor, NZ Railways remains largely 
dependent on the Government for financing significant operating and capital maintenance 
expenditure.  In 2005, NZ Railways received $61.6 million in Government grants. 
It was set up as a sort of semi-commercial Crown Entity basically and seemed to be 
making some quite good inroads but then it was sold. 
 
In retrospect [the privatisation of rail wasn’t a good thing].  The private sector, when 
they came in, took hundreds of millions of dollars out of rail and they milked it and 
sort of left the carcass there; left a wreck.  I suppose the private sector doesn’t really 
have a long-term vision [of profit].  So for rail, privatisation didn’t work (Senior 
executive, New Zealand Railways).   
 
 
Given the task faced by NZ Railways to restore and upgrade the rail network, an agreement 
was made between the SOE and the Government, such that it was not required to make a 
profit.  This arrangement directly opposes the intention of the SOE reforms, and is the only 
agreement of this kind which has been made with a New Zealand SOE. 
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Our aim is not to make a profit.  We’ve got a letter of recommendation from the 
Minister [of SOEs] which instructs us to cover our costs.  We are actually sort of a 
semi-commercial enterprise.  This happens to most railways in the world, there’s quite 
a strong underlying government support. In fact in Europe most of the infrastructure 
costs are actually paid for by the government (Senior executive, New Zealand 
Railways). 
Hence, significant variation in the financial independence and performance of SOEs is noted.  
Analysis of both the similarities and differences within these findings, however, raises a 
number of issues for discussion, and are considered below.  
 
 
Discussion 
An analysis of financial performance based on the tables and calculations above provides an 
overview of New Zealand’s SOEs, highlighting the financial outcomes of the SOE sector, 
and the potential for successful financial performance.  These findings provide insight into a 
number of issues such as the potential for financial returns within NPM, the elements 
contributing to successful performance, and the notion that SOEs will always fail (Moore, 
1992).  Each of these issues is considered below. 
 
While findings (refer Tables 4 and 5) show a significant range of financial performance 
outcomes for the 17 SOEs examined, cases of financial success are clearly evident.  Seven of 
the SOEs examined were classified as high performers based on ROE, yet results for ROCI 
and ROI mostly show significantly higher returns based on the amount of capital invested 
(ROCI) and the cash returns received (ROI).  The sustainability of the returns (Table 2) 
indicates SOEs can represent reliable sources of revenue.  The very high returns generated by 
SOEs which have developed strong businesses with relatively modest amounts of contributed 
capital, further indicates funding of public sector organisations is not necessarily capital 
intensive.   
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With respect to the context of the SOE reforms, a number of elements may be identified as 
important factors contributing to the financial success of SOEs in general.  A clear regulatory 
framework has ensured a strong awareness of accountability for profit within each SOE.  
Where profitability was unlikely, clear communication and agreements were in place 
outlining the operational issues and financial implications.  Such findings highlight the 
understanding by SOE executives of the importance of profit expectations and outcomes.  
Thus, a reference to accounting merely as rhetoric within NPM (Lapsley, 1999) is not 
supported in the context of New Zealand’s SOE sector.     
 
Through analysis and comparison of the individual SOEs, it is clear that accountability goes 
beyond a traditional public sector approach of transparency in accounting for the resources 
used.  Rather, findings show that while resources made available to SOEs through 
contributed capital are relatively static, SOEs are genuinely expected to be self-funding in 
their operations, and commercially successful in deregulated markets.  This notion is 
reinforced by comments from executives of SOEs in the high ROE category, who noted an 
assessment of commercial returns was an important aspect in determining the company’s 
business strategy and focus.   
 
A review of financial performance for individual SOEs provides a basis from which to 
identify clear financial benefits for both the individual organisations and the Government as 
owner and investor.  Thus, the notion that SOEs are not a viable form of public sector 
management is not supported by this study.  Rather, what this study does highlight is the 
principles central to New Zealand’s SOE reforms (e.g. SOEs operating in deregulated 
industries, revenue from Government sources based on commercial contracts, market 
deregulation, and express profit-making requirements), and the commonalities among SOEs 
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noted as strong performers within the sector (e.g. clear strategic direction, recognition for 
expertise within their core business, expansion into related areas).   
 
With respect to public sector management and policy, an evaluation of New Zealand’s SOEs 
suggests privatisation is not necessarily the only option (in contrast to the views of Moore, 
1992), but rather one option (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992), and that a case for competitive, 
commercial, and successful operations within the public sector does exist.  As noted by 
Lapsley (1999), the emphasis on profit in NPM effectively makes the invisible visible, and 
can be an important motivator of change.   A study of New Zealand’s SOEs provides support 
for this view, reinforcing Osborne and Gaebler’s observation that what gets measured gets 
done. 
 
Importantly, however, an examination of New Zealand’s SOEs also reveals that not all SOEs 
have achieved financial independence or success.  Terralink New Zealand Limited was 
unable to operate as a financially independent SOE, and rather than provide further financial 
support, the New Zealand Government chose to place the company into receivership.  
Similarly, NZ Railways is unable to operate as a financially independent SOE.  Thus, the 
traditional view of public sector organisations as non-commercial, capital intensive and costly 
‘investments’ to maintain, is not without support.  Based on the findings from New Zealand’s 
SOEs, it seems industries such as rail transport may struggle to achieve commercial returns, 
and are unlikely to yield strong financial returns for government.  Thus, NPM cannot 
guarantee profits within the public sector, but represents an important framework for 
enhancing efficiency with the opportunity for profit.   
 
Conclusion and implications 
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The implications of this study include the potential for public sector organisations as both 
effective providers of public services and profitable investments.  The broader economic 
implications of successful and sustainable operations under NPM indicate profitable SOEs 
may represent a sustainable and increasingly important source of funding for government. 
While this study focuses on SOEs operating in New Zealand, findings are not considered 
specific to the New Zealand context.  A growing number of countries are adopting principles 
of new public management (Khaleghian and Das Gupta, 2005), and with the appropriate 
regulatory framework, arguably enhanced financial performance and potentially financial 
returns, are achievable elsewhere.  This outlook presents an interesting alternative, with the 
opportunity to review the extent of government reliance on more traditional funding sources 
(e.g. taxation).  In 2005, revenue and profit from SOEs represented 15% of the New Zealand 
Government’s total revenue and profit for the year.  Tax revenue represented 70% of the New 
Zealand Government’s total revenue for the same year (New Zealand Government, 2005).   
 
Several limitations should be noted with respect to this study.  First, while this study 
specifically focuses on the financial returns of SOEs, non-financial performance measures are 
outside the scope of this paper and have therefore not been examined.  Although the 
Government and relevant authorities (e.g. Crown Company Monitoring Advisory Unit 
[CCMAU], 2005; New Zealand Treasury, 2000) have indicated a favourable view of SOE 
performance overall, certainly incidences of controversy and areas for improvement have 
been noted (Small, 2007).  Thus, a detailed review in this area is called for, but will 
invariably raise some of the concerns detailed previously (see section on Financial 
performance evaluation in the public sector).  With respect to the classification of individual 
SOEs’ financial performance, arbitrary classifications of high, medium, and low, were made 
taking a portfolio approach to examine the financial returns under NPM.  While comparisons 
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with industry benchmarks would perhaps provide a more suitable basis for comparison, such 
benchmarks are difficult to establish given the small size of New Zealand in general, as well 
as the small-sized industries (and, at times, natural monopolies) in which SOEs often operate.  
International comparisons raise further complexities due to the different contextual and 
environmental variables to be taken into consideration.  
    
There are also a number of areas for further research arising from this paper.  A more detailed 
understanding of individual cases within the context of New Zealand’s SOEs would provide 
further insight into the operational elements which contribute to financial success.  Further 
examination of revenues and expenses of individual SOEs (e.g. payments to Government in 
addition to income tax), would provide a more detailed analysis of the actual returns to 
Government.  Consideration of NPM in other counties will provide important comparative 
data on the financial outcomes of NPM in other public sector environments, including the 
implications for individual SOEs and the government as owner and investor.      
 
While market deregulation and profitable operations may not be possible within all 
government organisations, an examination of the potential benefits and outcomes suggests the 
notion should at least be considered.  As noted by Easton (1999) “if privatisation is the 
answer, very often one has misunderstood the question”.  This view is reinforced by Osborne 
and Gaebler (1992) who suggest privatisation is not a starting point for increasing efficiency 
in government.  Essentially “privatisation is one answer; not the answer” (Osborne and 
Gaebler, 1992: 45), and the issue of ownership should not be confused with importance of 
market dynamics.   
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This study has highlighted the potential for financial success within NPM.  Specifically, New 
Zealand’s SOE sector highlights the principles within a regulatory framework which have 
contributed to strong financial returns under NPM.  Further, it shows accountability within 
NPM can go beyond transparency in accounting for resources available, to incorporate an 
explicit and genuine focus on financial performance and profits.  Expectations and explicit 
measurement of financial performance and profits within public sector organisations may be 
one way of influencing activity to achieve the intended results under NPM.  These results 
represent benefits for both individual SOEs as well as the economies to which they 
contribute.   
 
Given that other disciplines within business such as entrepreneurship and management 
continue to explore and promote the potential for profits within the public sector through 
NPM from a non-financial perspective, it is important this issue is duly considered from a 
financial perspective.  The difficulty of balancing social and financial objectives is essentially 
relevant to all businesses, in both the public and private sector.  While the emphasis or 
balance between these objectives may be different for the two sectors, the case for (and 
results of) NPM suggest strong financial returns are possible within the public sector.    
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Notes 
1. As at 2005, Transpower was the only SOE subject to price controls set by the Electricity Commission, which 
introduced a cap on revenue growth calculated as the Consumer Price Index – 1% (Transpower, 2005).  
Transpower believed the cap was unreasonable, refused to comply with the Electricity Commission’s 
requirements, and did not expect to comply in the foreseeable future (Transpower, 2005).  
 
2. The establishment of Kiwibank by New Zealand Post Limited in 2001 is one exception, whereby the 
Government agreed to provide additional capital of $72.2 million as start-up funding (New Zealand Post, 2003). 
 
3. Within four SOEs, management and the Board have been able to justify that they do not have a need for debt, 
however the issue continues to be raised and reviewed by Government on a regular basis. 
 
4. The New Zealand equivalents to International Financial Reporting Standards are available for early adoption 
for financial periods beginning on or after 1 January 2005.  As at 30 June 2005, none of the 17 SOEs had 
adopted the new international standards, however several SOEs noted the significant impact the new standards 
would have on their financial reports in the future.  Mandatory adoption of the new standards in New Zealand 
applies to financial periods beginning on or after 1 January 2007.   
 
5. Television New Zealand Limited [TVNZ] was reclassified as a Crown Entity due to its role being primarily 
social rather than commercial, and Transmission Holdings, viewed as the commercial arm of TVNZ, was 
established as a new SOE in 2004. 
 
6. Individual executives and SOEs have generally not been identified with respect to interview data, due to 
requests for confidentiality from executives in three SOEs. 
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Table 1. 
Summary of SOEs operating in New Zealand 
Name Industry/core business
AgriQuality Ltd biosecurity services
Airways Corporation of New Zealand Ltd air traffic control services
Animal Control Products Ltd pesticide manufacturer
Asure New Zealand Ltd meat inspection
Genesis Power Ltd energy generation
Landcorp Farming Ltd farming
Learning Media Ltd developer of education products
Meridian Energy Limited energy generation
Meteorological Service of New Zealand Ltd weather forecasting
Mighty River Power Ltd energy generation
New Zealand Post Ltd postal services
New Zealand Railways Corporation Ltd (Ontrack) transport
Quotable Value Ltd property valuation services
Solid Energy New Zealand Ltd energy generation
Timberlands West Coast Ltd forestry
Transmission Holdings Ltd (now Kordia Group Ltd) transmission services
Transpower New Zealand Limited energy infrastructure provider  
 *SOEs operating in New Zealand as at 2005 
 
 
 
Table 2. 
Financial performance of the SOE sector  
$m 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Average
1 Revenue 4,479.75   5,488.42   6,188.28   5,714.92   6,870.23   5,748.32   
2 NPAT 354.15      455.96      485.74      482.13      837.40      523.07      
3 Total assets 10,602.77 10,289.20 12,222.31 12,160.04 16,152.57 12,285.38 
4 Contributed capital 4,254.63   4,334.93   4,343.83   4,281.92   4,287.72   4,300.60   
5 Equity 5,391.59   5,809.34   6,708.98   6,754.02   8,881.85   6,709.15   
6 Total liabilities 5,211.18   4,479.86   5,513.33   5,406.02   7,270.73   5,576.22   
7 Debt 3,164.11   3,068.24   3,515.04   3,865.06   4,120.37   3,546.57   
8 Dividends % 86% 73% 41% 33% 46% 56%
9 Dividends paid 303.61      333.54      197.42      160.69      385.07      276.07
10 Tax paid 190.37      122.12      151.35      253.56      306.79      204.84
11 Total payments 493.98 455.66 348.77 414.25 691.86 480.90
12 ROE 7% 8% 7% 7% 9% 8%
13 ROCI 8% 11% 11% 11% 20% 12%
14 ROI 12% 11% 8% 10% 16% 11%  
1. Revenue - reflects income from commercial services provided to government and non-government organisations.  Revenue from 
government sources is based on commercial rates, as a result of contracts won (and lost) with the government  
2. NPAT - net profit after tax 
3.  Total assets - based on year end values 
4.  Contributed capital – the amount of capital contributed by the New Zealand Government 
5.  Equity – total equity, including contributed capital, retained earnings, and reserves 
6.  Total liabilities – based on year end values 
7.  Debt – borrowings by SOEs  
8.  Dividends % - the amount of dividends paid compared to the amount of profits recorded in a particular year 
9.  Dividends paid – the amount of dividends paid during the year, based on negotiations between individual  SOEs and the Government, 
in view of profits, future plans, and capital investment requirements 
10.  Tax paid– the amount of tax paid during the year 
11.  Total payments – sum of dividend and tax payments made during the year, being the two main forms of cash returns to Government 
from SOEs 
12.  ROE – return on equity, calculated as net profit after tax/equity 
13.  ROCI – return on capital invested, calculated as net profit after tax/contributed capital 
14.  ROI – return on investment, calculated as total payments (cash returns) to Government/contributed capital 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. 
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Analysis of ROE components for the SOE sector 
ROE analysis 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Average
Asset t/o 42% 53% 51% 47% 43% 47%
Margin 8% 8% 8% 8% 12% 9%
Leverage 197% 177% 182% 180% 182% 184%
Liabilties/Equity 97% 77% 82% 80% 82% 84%
Debt/Equity 59% 53% 52% 57% 46% 54%  
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Table 4. 
Financial performance of individual SOEs 
$m  
AgriQuality Airways Animal Ctl Asure MetService Quotable VSolid Energy Genesis Learning M Meridian Mighty R Pw NZ Post TransmissionTranspower Landcorp NZ Rail Timberlands
Revenue 77.1            116.2           6.5            44.1            25.9          33.8          307.1         1,177.7     24.0          1,246.7       634.3         1,030.9     127.3          548.2         116.7         34.0             22.4          
NPAT 3.0              7.3               1.2            1.1              3.3            1.2            28.0           63.9          0.4            133.9          88.1           48.4          13.8            77.8           22.7           19.4             1.2            
Total assets 30.4            114.8           5.4            15.2            14.0          14.6          217.2         1,317.4     11.8          3,559.5       1,755.9      1,439.8     182.7          2,258.7      766.2         43.5             76.1          
Contributed capital 11.9            41.1             0.1            10.2            5.0            4.6            60.9           540.6        1.2            1,600.0       377.6         177.8        87.7            1,200.0      125.0         7.8               15.0          
Equity 18.3            42.1             4.6            7.1              8.7            7.0            118.4         1,007.4     4.6            2,090.2       1,050.9      333.3        96.8            1,030.7      631.7         29.9             69.4          
Total liabilities 12.1            72.7             0.8            8.2              5.3            7.6            98.8           310.0        7.2            1,469.3       705.0         1,106.5     85.9            1,228.1      134.5         13.6             6.6            
Debt 1.7              35.0             -            -              1.6            2.4            23.5           116.2        -            1,085.8       472.1         159.5        58.6            1,330.6      112.5         3.0               -            
Dividends % 57% 110% 58% 43% 100% 39% 6% 34% 15% 83% 26% 41% 63% 137% 91% 54% 10%
Dividends paid 1.7              8.2               0.7            0.6              3.4            0.5            2.0             21.3          0.1            97.1            27.5           15.6          8.5              52.2           17.5           0.7               0.3            
Tax paid 1.8              3.7               0.6            1.0              1.6            0.9            7.8             43.2          0.2            48.5            29.4           22.5          5.9              32.9           2.5             -              0.6            
Total payments 3.4              11.9             1.3            1.0              5.0            1.4            9.8             64.5          0.2            145.5          56.9           38.1          14.4            85.1           20.0           1.9               0.9            
ROE 17% 17% 26% 16% 39% 18% 25% 6% 8% 6% 9% 13% 14% 7% 4% 25% 2%
ROCI 25% 18% 1214% 11% 65% 27% 46% 12% 33% 8% 23% 27% 16% 6% 18% 618% 8%
ROI 29% 29% 1302% 10% 100% 30% 16% 12% 19% 9% 15% 22% 16% 7% 16% 24% 6%  
* based on average figures from 2001-2005 
     
High ROE ≥ 15%
Medium 5% < ROE < 15%
Low ROE ≤ 5%  
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Table 5. 
High-low range of individual SOE financial performance 
$m 
  
Revenue 6.5              Animal Ctl 1,246.7     Meridian
NPAT 0.4              Learning M 133.9        Meridian
Total assets 5.4              Animal Ctl 3,559.5     Meridian
Contributed capital 0.1              Animal Ctl 1,600.0     Meridian
Equity 4.6              Learning M 2,090.2     Meridian
Total liabilities 0.8              Animal Ctl 1,469.3     Meridian
Debt -              Animal Ctl^ 1,330.6     Transpower
Dividends % 6% Solid Energy 137% Transpower
Dividends paid 0.1              Learning M 97.1          Meridian
Tax paid -              NZ Rail 48.5          Meridian
Total payments 0.2              Learning M 145.5        Meridian
ROE 2% Timberlands 39% MetService
ROCI 6% Transpower 1214% Animal Ctl
ROI 6% Timberlands 1302% Animal Ctl
Low High
      
* based on average figures from 2001-2005 
^ Animal Control Products is one of four SOEs with nil debt 
